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Using a New-Keynesian ﬂexi-price model with external habit formation in con-
sumption and labor supply, we identify the channels underlying the Easterlin Paradox
(or “Happiness Inertia”, its generalization). These include whether external habit
formation is in “diﬀerence” or “ratio” form; the growth and convexity characteristics
of non-pecuniary eﬀects; and the nature of risk aversion. We show that the impact
of labor habit formation on welfare can (unlike consumption) be positive or nega-
tive. The form of habit formation (rather than habit per se) is a key determinant of
whether welfare functions reproduce happiness inertia; only when habit is modelled
in ratio form, does this possibility open up. The model thus bridges the gap between
theoretical models and social policy, pecuniary and non-pecuniary motives.
JEL Classiﬁcation: H21, H32, C11, C52.
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Bad.
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It is now thirty ﬁve years since Easterlin (1974) raised a paradox that has intrigued and
haunted the economics profession: beyond a certain income there may be little, if any,
relationship between increases in per-capita income and average social welfare (“happi-
ness”). Figure 1 illustrates: whilst income per head in the US has been growing continu-
ously since WWII the proportion of survey respondents who reported being “very happy”
appears broadly unchanged. Since then there have been considerable (and arguably in-
conclusive) attempts to empirically validate this paradox, see Frey (2008) for a discussion.
However, if the empirical literature is voluminous, the corresponding eﬀort to model the
paradox appears scarcer.1 This paper is a step towards bridging that gap. Moreover, we
shall work with a generalization of the paradox, which we label “Happiness Inertia” which
nests the Easterlin Paradox as a special case.
Figure 1: Income and Happiness in the United States. Source Layard(2006)
The literature identiﬁes the relativity approach humans take in appraising their well-
being as a key explanation for Happiness Inertia. This implies that an agent is adversely
aﬀected by the relative consumption levels of others in society (also known as Catching
1One key reason for this lack of theoretical work had been the strong disagreement on using the utility
function as a proxy for subjective well-being. However, recent empirical work (see Clark et al. (2008)) has
lead to a wider acceptance for this association and has consequently opened up opportunities for theoretical
advancements in the area.
1Up with or Keeping Up with the Joneses).2 Thus, even though the agent may becoming
richer, that his peers are too makes him appreciate less of what he has (e.g., see Arrow
and Dasgupta (2007), Blanchﬂower and Oswald (2004), Di Tella et al. (2003)).3
We study behavior in the presence of such relativity in the context of a benchmark
ﬂexi-price New Keynesian model.4 We study diﬀerent types of habit formation (diﬀerence
and ratio forms5) in consumption and labor-supply choices; for the cases of balanced and
non-balanced growth paths; and for the emergence of essentially non-pecuniary eﬀects.
In so doing, we identify the channels that underlie the Easterlin Paradox and Happiness
Inertia: namely, the strength and nature of habit formation, risk aversion, non-pecuniary
eﬀects and welfare convexities.
Several interesting results emerge. For instance, habit formation - a mainstay of areas
like the equity-price puzzle, savings-growth dynamics, business-cycle analysis - has an
ambiguous role in explaining Happiness Inertia. On a non-balanced growth path, habit is
important in explaining Happiness Inertia. However, if Happiness Inertia is to be more
than a transitory phenomenon, we should be focused on the long run. We show that
only if habit preferences are speciﬁed in ratio form does it play a role along the balanced
growth path. Moreover, not all forms of habit formation impact welfare in the same
direction. Further, one interesting case surfaces whereby the most consumption and habit-
rich societies are the “least happy” (have the lowest welfare).
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the optimizing
model with external habit formation in consumption and labor supply (modelled in both
diﬀerence and ratio forms). In Section 3 we used comparative statics from the model
to match the Easterlin Paradox (and its generalization, Happiness Inertia). Section 4
concludes.
2The idea that agents make relative comparisons in consumption and use it as a way to gain and project
social status has a long lineage in economics, perhaps the most famous early example being Veblen (1899).
3Another perspective of relativity relates to habituation. Here, the joy from higher income and con-
sumption is short-lived in that the agent fails to foresee its getting-used-to aspect and will require, over
time, a further income boost to sustain the happiness. Here, however, we concentrate on the more familiar
catching-up with the Joneses case.
4Relative comparisons in consumption are a common modelling device. However, we also examine that
in labor supply, consistent, for instance, with the literature on “workaholism” (e.g., Oates (1971)).
5See Tsoukis (2007) for a detailed taxonomy of habit forms.
22 The Model
2.1 Two Formulations of Habit Formation and the External Bad
We consider two formulations of social comparisons. The ﬁrst is the diﬀerence form where



















where ¯ is the household’s discount factor, Ct(r) is an index of consumption, Lt(r)
are hours worked, HC;t represents social comparisons in consumption, thus the desire







is aggregate consumption (which the agent takes as exogenous), with
hC 2 [0;1). Similarly HL;t = hLLt¡j j ¸ 0, represents social comparisons in labour







is a Dixit-Stigliz aggregate of diﬀerentiated labour
supplied by households with hL 2 (¡1;1).
Note, in contrast to consumption habit, labor-supply habit may be positive or negative:
when the agent sees his peers working more he may feel less unhappy about himself working
as much (a positive externality) or instead may feel pressure to join them (a negative
one). Parameters ¾ > 0 and Á ¸ 0 reﬂect risk aversion and the real-wage labor supply
elasticity and ·i are preference shocks (alternatively, welfare weightings). If ¾ = 1 we
attain balanced or steady-state growth.
Is the contribution of consumption and labor supply and their habit forms suﬃcient to
generate Happiness Inertia? If so, then the Easterlin Paradox is merely some special case
of the agent’s standard optimization problem. If not, then the expression of the agent’s
welfare must be modiﬁed; the question is how? To account for this possibility, we introduce
an extra argument, X, which we agnostically label an “external bad”. Generically, it can
be viewed in the similar vein to a Solow residual: in our context, what part of the agent’s
welfare cannot be ascribed to transactions in consumption and employment.
The notion of the bad can be thought of as arising from Easterlin (2003)’s distinction
between pecuniary and non-pecuniary activities in the context of well-being. The former
6Note, the fact that i ¸ 0, means the formulation is consistent with both Keeping Up With (i = 0) and
Catching Up With the Joneses (i ¸ 0).
3can cause unhappiness because agents wrongly assume their pecuniary preferences are
ﬁxed. Thus, more income and consumption possibilities are seen by deﬁnition as welfare
improving (and therefore worth striving for). However, given the presence of hedonic
adaption (or, alternatively, habit formation) increasing income will instead simply raise
agents’ aspirations equivalent to their material gains, leaving happiness static. By contrast,
non-pecuniary activities (e.g., family/marriage quality, leisure, friendship, desire for social
fairness and equality) are characterized by either no (or signiﬁcantly less) hedonic aspects.
As Easterlin (2003) comments “... most individuals spend a disproportionate amount of
their lives working to make money, and sacriﬁce family life and health, domains in which
aspirations remain fairly constant”. Thus the bad (accordingly, modelled with no habit
formation) captures these non-pecuniary aspects in the agent’s assessment of his well-being
(and its trade oﬀ with pecuniary activities manifested by the negative sign in the welfare
function).
But what determines X? Perhaps, indeed like the Solow residual, we should consider
its growth as exogenous or else tied up with so many intertwining unobservables as to
be ostensibly exogenous. Alternatively, the growth of the bad and consumption may be
somehow related. For example, at the level of the agent, with higher incomes comes
more pressure for longer work commitments7, potentially crowding out family and leisure
activities tending to many recognized modern ills - higher divorces rates, work-related
stress etc. Indeed, higher economic growth could also - ` a la the “Kuznets curve” - widen
inequality over some developmental ranges tending to deepen social distress. Or else with
population growth comes struggles over the rights to scarce resources tending once more
to immiserizing welfare. In psychology literatures, the economic bad can be equated with
what James (2008) and De Graaf et al. (2001) have labelled aﬄuenza: the psychological
distress incurred by keeping up with the Joneses.8 However, there is no necessity to link
changes in the external bad to economic growth. It may simply reﬂect changes over time
in the quality of public institutions, inter-personal conﬂict, public health issues etc.
Here we take no particular stand on the rights or wrongs of including such a term in
the welfare function, only to observe what its qualitative characteristics might be. The
only restriction on parameter ' is ' 6= ¡1. If ' > 0 the bad incurs convex welfare
7We could thus view X as reﬂecting “aspiration-levels”, namely that as an individual’s income increases
(e.g., from promotion) the pressure for superior performance may reduce welfare, Irwin (1944).
8Thus, whilst hC denotes the eﬀect social comparisons has on economic evolutions (such as growth in
consumption behavior), X reﬂects the associated psychological distress incurred.
4costs; if ' 2 (¡1;0) or ' < 0 costs are concave.9. Finally, note X, is not intended
to be an abstract concept. There has been substantial work is devising, collecting and
measuring quality/satisfaction of life and happiness indicators (and, by implication, of
unhappiness) and non-pecuniary measures of well-being by a number of international
bodies and researchers, see Diener (2000), Veenhoven (2008), Kahneman and Schwarz
(1999)). Weighing these against conventional pecuniary welfare measures is a feasible and
indeed ongoing agenda.



















where instead HC;t = C
hC
t¡i and HL;t = L
hL
t¡j, i;j ¸ 0.
Essentially therefore external habit in diﬀerence form implies the agent is concerned
about absolute comparisons, whilst that in ratio form is framed more in growth terms.




1¡¾ we have respectively, ¾ and ° = ¾ ¡ hC(¾ ¡ 1), which
coincide for hC = 0; but 8hC > 0, ° · ¾ iﬀ ¾ ¸ 1.
2.2 Optimization Behavior
The representative household maximizes (1) or (2) taking external habits HC;t and HL;t












1¡´ is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate wage index.
Turning to the supply side, competitive ﬁnal goods ﬁrms use a continuum of interme-







9A similar condition could be placed on the Frisch parameter Á, but the literature usually imposes
Á > 0.
5where ³ is the elasticity of substitution. This implies a set of demand equations for each











1¡³ is an aggregate intermediate price index, but since ﬁnal
goods ﬁrms are competitive and the only inputs are intermediate goods, it is also the GDP
price level.
In the intermediate goods sector each good f is produced by a single ﬁrm f using
diﬀerentiated labor with technology,





is an index of diﬀerentiated labor types used
by the ﬁrm, where Lt(r;f) is the labor input of type r by ﬁrm f. At is an exogenous
shock capturing shifts to trend total factor productivity. In each period intermediate ﬁrm








In equilibrium households and ﬁrms are identical: Ct(r) = Ct and Lt(f) = Lt: The
deterministic zero-inﬂation, zero-growth steady state implies,




















where Rt is the nominal interest rate and (9) equates the marginal rate of substitution
with the real wage. Mark-up 1
1¡ 1
´
reﬂects the market power of the household in the labor
market.
6For habit in diﬀerence form the steady-state marginal utilities are:
ΛD
c = (1 ¡ hC)[(1 ¡ hC)C]¡¾ (12)
ΛD
L = ¡·L(1 ¡ hL)[(1 ¡ hL)L]Á; (13)
and for the ratio form,
ΛR
c = (1 ¡ hC)C¡¾+hC(¾¡1) (14)
ΛR
L = ¡·L(1 ¡ hL)LÁ¡(1+Á)hL: (15)
3 Confronting “Happiness Inertia”
We deﬁne Happiness Inertia as a generalization of the Easterlin Paradox: as living stan-
dards improve (e.g., from a positive technology shock), welfare may either remain con-
stant, decline, or increase less than proportionally. We deﬁne these as, respectively, strict
(±Ω0
±C = 0), absolute (±Ω0
±C < 0) and weak (±Ω0
±C < 1) Happiness Inertia. The Easterlin Para-
dox arises as a limiting case, namely strict Happiness Inertia. In what follows we mostly
focus on that; the other two inequality cases follow naturally.
So can the existence of external habit in itself explain the Happiness Inertia/Easterlin
Paradox? To answer this, consider some comparative statics as consumption increases
alongside some increase in the “bad”, X.
3.1 Results For Habit-in-Diﬀerence Form


























Taking into account the consumption - leisure choice we can eliminate labor supply using







(¾ ¡ 1)(1 ¡ Φ)(1 ¡ hL)














¸ 0 is a measure of market distortions where the combi-
nation ´ = ³ = 1 (Φ = 0) nests the case of no distortions in product or labor markets.
Interestingly, (16) shows that whilst habit in consumption decreases the level of welfare
(ditto, the “bad” and labor supply) habit formation in labor supply can go either way
depending on its sign. Thus not all sources of habit impact welfare equivalently. Or to
paraphrase our discussion in the Introduction: burning the midnight oil alongside one’s
colleagues can be viewed both positively or negatively.
But, returning to the paradox, what can we say about welfare growth as consumption
and the “bad” rise? Diﬀerentiating (17) with respect to time, implies for weak (i.e., >),
strict (=) and absolute (<) inertia cases,
[(1 ¡ hC)C]1¡¾ £


















(1+Á)(1¡hC) . In the non balanced growth case, we see that basically all
the parameters of the agent’s decision environment (both forms of habit, risk aversion,
labor supply elasticity etc.) matter for the presence of Happiness Inertia.
Equation (18) thus represents the general case; if ¾ = 1, our welfare function exhibits
the particular instance of balanced growth. In that case, the ﬁrst term on the right-hand
side of (17) becomes log[(1 ¡ hC)C] and the condition for strict Happiness Inertia (i.e.,
±ΩD
0

















Equation (19) highlights that even in a balanced growth path Happiness Inertia emerges.
Under balanced-growth there is a welfare link between consumption and the “bad” since
the (otherwise positive) eﬀect of material improvements on welfare can be curbed by the
latter’s convexity. To illustrate (normalizing ·X to unity for expositional convenience) if
' ¡! ¡1, strict Happiness Inertia implies that consumption growth must match that in
the “bad”.10
Overall, two conclusions emerge from (18) and (19). First, with external habit in
consumption of the diﬀerence variety the short-term growth of consumption, in the vicinity
10Of course, if the agent can somehow shield herself from these bads (·X = 0), such considerations
evaporate. This may help explain the modern rise of “gated communities” and homogenous residential
clusters (Dinzey-Flores (2006)).
8of a given level C = ¯ C say, needed to sustain strict Happiness Inertia increases with
hC. Second, more importantly, note that external habit in diﬀerence form plays no role
in explaining long-term (or steady-state) strict Happiness Inertia: only the existence of
growth in the “bad” and its nature can do so.11
3.2 Results For Habit-in-Ratio Form
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Again the presence of the external bad decreases the level of welfare, although the
impact of habit in consumption is dependent on the value of ¾, whilst habit in labor supply
now imparts no eﬀect. But, notably, ((see (22)) habit in consumption now increases the
growth of consumption required to match the long-term growth of the “bad” for strict
Happiness Inertia to hold and therefore now has, alongside the “bad”, a role in explaining
the paradox. In fact, the higher is hC the more society must engage in consumption growth
to oﬀset the bad (see (22)) although (looking at (20)) they risk lower welfare and lower
happiness (as (20) shows). Thus consumption-rich societies may be welfare poor if they
make strong interpersonal comparisons with ratio preferences.
Looking again at the non-balanced growth case, if ¾ > 1, we can compare the short-run
bursts of consumption growth necessary to keep pace with the growth of the “bad” under
strict Happiness Inertia, in the vicinity of a particular consumption level. For the latter,
to compare the two utilities, we choose a level ¯ C at which (17) and (20) are equal for a
11Beath and FitzRoy (2007) construct a simple model with unemployment, habit and heterogeneous
agents, but without the other distortions of our model, that is consistent with happiness-inertia.










For the diﬀerence and ratio forms, denote by gD
C and gR
C respectively the short-run bursts
of growth in the vicinity of ¯ C (given by (23)) consistent with strict Happiness Inertia, for
a given X and dX









C for hC 2 (0;1) and, as for the balanced growth case, the short-run growth of
consumption needed to compensate for a given path of “bad” in a strict Happiness Inertia
outcome is higher for the ratio form of habit. Thus from both a short-run and long-run
perspective, external habit in ratio form helps to explain Happiness Inertia better than
the diﬀerence form.
4 Conclusions
Empirical studies trying to validate the Easterlin Paradox are plentiful. This paper,
however, has taken a quite diﬀerent tack. We instead asked how could we modify the
agent’s decision framework to integrate and account for this paradox. We have done so
in a simple, tractable manner. We show the parameterizations that lead to forms of the
paradox in both balanced and non-balanced growth paths.
Our modelling of Happiness Inertia and the Easterlin Paradox suggests:
(a) If income growth does not increase happiness (or even if not in a commensurate
manner), then standard analysis is open to the criticism of being a partial account
of welfare. This, in turn, would underscore the need for policy makers to look be-
yond purely economic indicators to measure well-being, e.g., Kahneman and Stone
(2004), Layard (2006). In recent years there has been much activity in generating
well-founded internationally-comparable measures of social satisfaction and dissat-
isfaction (e.g., Diener (2000), Veenhoven (2008), Kahneman and Schwarz (1999)).
Our framework provides a simple structure to analyze how such measures of satis-
faction (for instance, their growth and convexity characteristics, possible links with
10economic growth) can be meaningfully compared with that of traditional transaction
in consumption and employment in the agent’s welfare analysis.
(b) Habit formation has been widely recognized as a key channel in the happiness liter-
ature, and indeed is a mainstay of other literatures such as the equity-price puzzle.
Yet, we have shown that its role is relatively complex in explaining Happiness Iner-
tia. Its importance depends on what forms and types of habit are involved. Habit
in consumption, for instance, tends to impact welfare levels negatively whilst labor
habit can go either way. Under non-balanced growth, habit formation will matter
just as many other facets of the agent’s optimization environment matter. However,
if Happiness Inertia is to be more than a transitory phenomenon, we must focus on
the long run with a balanced growth path (the ¾ = 1 case). It turns out that only
if habit preferences are speciﬁed in ratio form does it play a role in the balanced
growth path. Thus, the form of Habit formation (rather than habit per se) is a
key determinant of whether welfare functions reproduce Happiness Inertia. In our
context, only when habit is modelled in ratio form, does this possibility open up.
(c) If economic growth brings unintended side-eﬀects (e.g., congestion, crime) or such
“bad”s arise naturally from human interaction, then simply to maintain welfare over
time (as Easterlin surmised) requires increasing degrees of consumption compen-
sation. If society is habit-rich in consumption (with ratio preferences) then that
compensatory consumption will be higher than in its absence (or with diﬀerence
preferences). Thus, societies may end up being consumption and habit rich, but
welfare poor.
(d) Overall, the degree to which a society is aﬄicted by some degree of Happiness In-
ertia depends on ·X (the “bad” preference weight); the form of habit formation
(diﬀerence or ratio); the degree of convexity in the “bad”, '; and the growth in the
“bad” (or aﬄuenza) term. The nature of risk aversion, ¾, determines the dynamics
outside the balanced-growth path.
Our conclusions contribute to bridging the gap between theoretical models and social
policy, between standard economic analysis and psychology literatures. Accordingly, a
number of interesting directions for future research are suggested by this study. It would
be useful to empirically discriminate between diﬀerent types of habit formations and their
strength to better understand habit’s contribution to the paradox.
11Further, given, e.g., Layard (2006)’s well-known advocacy of “corrective taxation”to
curtail the possibly negative consequences of hedonic adaption, knowledge of the various
channels underlying Happiness Inertia (i.e., as in point (d)) might usefully inform welfare-
maximizing ﬁscal policy.
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